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The result of the work of the Election Commission was a 93% poll of the 
eligible voters. 63% were cast for Mugabe who won 57 seats; 24% for Nkomo 
who got 20; 8% for Muzorewa who won only 3 seats. The Rhodesia Front had 
previously won all the 20 White seats.4 The voters chose peace, believing that 
Mugabe would provide it. Muzorewa, the Methodist Bishop, was the "fall guy". 
He had promised peace and equal pay for Black and White but had not been 
able to deliver either. 
The presence of Gordon Fairweather, the distinguished New Brunswicker 
who had contested nine Canadian elections, ensured that at least one of the 
Commonwealth Observers had practical political experience. He remarked to 
me that he was much moved by the success of this Commonwealth undertaking; 
in particular, by his realization at the London briefing, that all his colleagues 
understood election procedure on the Westminster model, whether they were 
from Papua-New Guinea, Nigeria or Australia. They well-understood the 
powers of governors, councils, courts and the police and they had a common 
language.5 The election had been a demonstration that the sun may have set on 
the British Empire but that the Commonwealth that lives on is a force for 
peace, reconciliation and good government. 
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SWIFT AND BOLD: 
AN APPRAISAL OF HOSTAGE RESCUE OPERATIONS 
by David Charters 
In the rush to judgement and print during the next few months the armchair 
strategists and instant historians of the American hostage rescue operation in 
Iran will find much to criticize. This is unavoidable; the story released thus far 
leaves many questions unanswered. Since, however, the operation was not 
carried through to conclusion and the complete plan has not been explained, it is 
worth introducing a note of caution; any analysis at this early stage is likely to 
be highly speculative. Above all, facile comparisons with obviously "successful" 
operations, such as Entebbe, are to be avoided. Nothing emerges more clearly 
from the historical record than the fact that in all hostage rescue operations, the 
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margin between success and failure is very slim indeed. By focussing on the com-
ponents of success and failure, illustrated in two cases and reinforced by recent 
experience, this study will attempt to draw out the kind of lessons against which 
the American operation might be judged. It may be possible then to suggest 
some general guidelines for Canadian approaches to the hostage rescue 
problem. 
Stanleyville1 
In August 1964, at the height of the civil war that marked the early years of 
Congolese (Zaire) independence, rebel forces of Christophe Gbenye captured 
the major town of Stanleyville. Initially, Americans, Belgians and other 
Europeans taken as prisoners were well treated, but as the fortunes of war 
turned against the rebels the non-Africans were harassed and threatened. 
Missionaries in outlying areas were raped and beaten. Early in November the 
rebels decided to treat all whites in Stanleyville, now numbering some 1300, as 
hostages in the bargaining for a cease fire (300 more were held at Paulis, about 
250 miles northeast of Stanleyville). Negotiations started in Nairobi, Kenya 
under the auspices of Kenyan Prime Minister Jomo Kenyatta, but the discus-
sions were one-sided. The rebels insisted that the hostages would be freed only if 
the Congo government's army stopped advancing on Stanleyville, which the 
rebels regarded as their capital. Moreover, Gbenye's control over his rebel 
forces, who called themselves "Simbas" (Lions), was clearly tenuous and as his 
anti-American rhetoric heated up, there was a very real danger that the hostages 
would be massacred. 
On instructions from Washington, the American ambassador broke off 
negotiations. The American, British and Belgian governments agreed to coop-
erate in mounting an airborne rescue operation. Twelve U.S. Air Force C-130's 
and four C-124's air-lifted the Belgian Regiment Para-Commando, totalling 
600 men, to the British airbase at Ascension Island in the South Atlantic, where 
the force was held in readiness while planning was completed. They were then 
flown to the airfield at Kamina, some 600 miles from Stanleyville; Kamina 
became the mounting base for the operation. Stanleyville possessed two air-
fields, only one of which was serviceable. Since rapid evacuation of the hostages 
would be essential, the airborne forces decided to capture the operational field. 
At about 5:00 a.m., November 24, 300 paratroopers jumped from seven 
C-130's and quickly took control of the airfield. Twenty minutes later, the 
second wave of 235 soldiers landed in the aircraft, bringing with them a number 
of light vehicles. 
The Simbas had seen the paradrop and began to collect, assemble and murder 
their hostages. Sixty died before the Belgian troops arrived and put a stop to the 
slaughter. The remaining hostages were evacuated by aircraft. Four hours after 
the paradrop, Congo government forces entered Stanleyville and gradually 
took control of the town. Two days later the Belgians jumped into Paulis and 
freed the remaining hostages. In the two rescue operations the Belgian force 
suffered three killed and ten wounded. 
The Munich Olympics Incident2 
At 4:20 a.m. on September 5, 1972, eight members of the Black September 
27 
terrorist organization penetrated the security perimeter of the Olympic Village 
and forced their way into the Israeli compound, killing two Israeli atheletes and 
taking nine as hostages. Shortly thereafter, they made known their demands: the 
release of 100 Arabs held in Israeli jails and their transportation to Egypt, and 
safe passage to Egypt of the Olympic terrorist team. The terrorists indicated 
that if these demands were not met by 9:00 a.m., they would start killing 
hostages, two at a time. Specialists in international assassination and sabotage 
operations, the Black September terrorists were armed with machine guns and 
hand grenades. 
Negotiations between the West German, Israeli and Egyptian governments 
were initiated, but proved fruitless: the Israeli government refused to capitulate 
to the terrorists' demands and the Egyptians refused to become involved. 
Unaware of the state of international negotiations, the terrorists were persuaded 
to extend their deadline four times, the last deadline being 9:00 p.m. The final 
Israeli rejection was not communicated to the terrorists. By late afternoon, it 
was clear that some form of rescue would have to be attempted. 
During the day the police had established a command post a short distance 
from the hostage site and had cordoned off the immediate area around the 
compound. Covert surveillance was maintained and snipers and assault teams 
were moved into position. Early in the day, a Crisis Staff was formed at the 
Command Post, consisting of the Interior Minister of the West German Gov-
ernment, who was responsible for liaison with the foreign governments, the 
Minister of State for Bavaria, who exercised overall political and police respon-
sibility for any action taken, and the Police President (Chief) of Munich, who 
was responsible for planning and executing any tactical action. Once it was 
decided that the hostages should be rescued, the Crisis Staff was confronted by 
the fact that none of the methods and locations for such an operation were satis-
factory. Direct assault on the compound was ruled out immediately: the four 
storey housing complex afforded ample protection to the terrorists, who would 
be able to inflict casualties on both the hostages and the police during any 
assault. At 7:30 p.m. the Crisis Staff decided that the rescue attempt would be 
made when the terrorists and the hostages walked from the compound to the 
helipad, a distance of some 800 metres. It was recognized that the terrorists 
could not be shot without risk to the hostages. (A rescue at the Fürstenfeldbruck 
air base was regarded as a secondary but unsatisfactory rescue plan. Although 
the airport apron provided clear fields of fire, there was little cover for sharp-
shooters and none at all for an assault team.) 
When the terrorist leader saw the route his group would have to walk to reach 
the helicopters he changed his mind and demanded a bus to take them to the 
helipad. This, therefore, ruled out the primary rescue plan, leaving only the 
airport as a poor alternative. At the airport three snipers were positioned on the 
roof of the headquarters building, overlooking the apron, while two others were 
in covered positions beyond the apron, behind where the helicopters would land. 
An 18 man assault team, armed with pistols and positioned within the airliner 
on the apron, was withdrawn shortly before the helicopters arrived because the 
squad leader assessed the position to be tactically hazardous and his team 
insufficiently armed and trained. 290 policemen secured the headquarters build-
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ing, which had become the new command post, and the airport perimeter. A 
further 24 officers and six armoured vehicles were on their way to the scene 
when the shooting began. 
The helicopters carrying the terrorists and hostages arrived in darkness at 
10:35 p.m. Two of the terrorists disembarked and walked down the floodlit 
apron to inspect the airliner. Ten minutes later, as they returned to the heli-
copters the police opened fire. The ensuing firefight lasted, with intermittent 
periods of snooting and silence, for about one hour, 25 minutes. During this 
time, all the hostages were killed, five of the terrorists were killed and three 
captured, one police officer was killed and two wounded. 
Several factors contributed to the tragedy. The decision to withdraw the 
assault team, although understandable under the circumstances, left the police 
with no means of effecting a physical rescue of the hostages and no time to make 
revised plans. To rely, as they were forced to do, solely on shooting to rescue the 
hostages would have been very risky under the best of situations; as it was, the 
marksmen had not trained as a unit, and the two marksmen beyond the apron 
were not given specific fire orders — they were told simply to start shooting 
when they heard the other three open fire. Secondly, early in the firefight 
terrorist gunfire cut a communications cable. The control tower could transmit, 
but could not receive. The radio staff assumed, however, that they could do 
neither. Consequently, the extra 24-man unit was not called into action when it 
arrived on the scene. Furthermore, reserves moved from the Olympic Village 
and the Munich Commercial airport were delayed by crowds of curious 
onlookers who caused traffic jams on all roadways. There is some reason to 
believe that the crowds were caused by leaking of the plan to the news media. 
Finally, police units at the airport did not have firepower equal to that of the 
terrorists and, although the entire apron was well lit, no more than four 
terrorists were visible at any one time. The police marksmen failed to kill or 
disable all of them quickly and this gave the terrorists time to kill the hostages. 
Issues and Lessons 
One general comment might be made at the outset: the use of force should be 
regarded always as a last resort; by its very nature it places the lives of the 
hostages and the rescuers at grave risk, as even the successful Stanleyville opera-
tion clearly illustrates. This is not to suggest that governments should avoid the 
use of force to the extent that they confront terrorism with appeasement. 
Rather, all steps short of surrender should be attempted before violence is used. 
America's current preoccupation with the Iranian crisis may have obscured 
valuable lessons of the Bogatâ hostage incident. In this case Colombian 
terrorists seized 56 diplomats and civilians representing 15 countries, releasing 
more than half this number before the final dénouement. The terrorists origin-
ally demanded the release of 311 "political prisoners" and a ransom of $50 
million, but after long, skilful and patient bargaining by officials they eventually 
exchanged their remaining prisoners for a smaller dollar ransom and a flight to 
Cuba. The technique of "talking down" hostage-takers in a low-key manner 
over a period of time has a high record of success in both the criminal and politi-
cal arenas. The passage of time allows the perpetrators to develop a perspective 
on their situation. If they can be convinced, calmly and rationally, that there is 
29 
no other "honourable" way out, they may reduce their demands or abandon 
them altogether, surrendering themselves and releasing their hostages. Further-
more, the bargaining process may permit the hostage-takers to develop a 
rapport with their captives and with the authorities. Usually, the longer a siege 
goes on the harder it is for the perpetrators to kill their hostages. In short, talk 
and time saves lives.4 
Of course, this does not always happen. At Stanleyville and at Entebbe the 
passage of time appeared to place the hostages at greater risk.5 In the recent 
incident at the Iranian embassy in London the terrorists started shooting their 
hostages after six days of apparently fruitful bargaining.6 The reasons for the 
failure of the "talk and time" formula in some cases will be the subject of a 
future article; what is important for this study is the principle that security 
forces should be prepared to effect a rescue as soon as the hostages are abused or 
threatened with immediate execution. Failure to act at this point may result in a 
tragedy.7 But the ability to carry out a successful rescue depends on a variety of 
factors; the principal ones are as follows: 
1. Intelligence — "The product resulting from the collection, evaluation, 
analysis, integration and interpretation of all available information which 
concerns one or more aspects of foreign nations or of areas of operations 
and which is immediately or potentially significant to military planning 
and operations."8 Accurate information on the background and motives 
of the hostage-takers, their physical and psychological state, as well as 
that of their captives, and on the physical/tactical layout of the incident 
site, is essential for briefing the rescue team and drafting an appropriate 
plan. Whenever possible, much of this information should be obtained 
before an incident occurs. Inadequate intelligence contributed to the 
failure of the American rescue mission to the Sontay Prisoner of War 
Camp in North Vietnam in 1970 and to the high cost in lives of the 
successful rescue of the SS Mayaguez and its crew from Cambodia in 
1975.9 It is equally clear that good intelligence work was central to the 
successful rescue operation at the Iranian Embassy in London.10 
2. Contingency Planning — The product of good intelligence work. 
Obviously, it is not possible to have separate plans to cover every even-
tuality, but once the likely threats have been assessed and targets 
anticipated, general response guidelines may be drafted. Once an incident 
begins, on-site "think tanks" can adapt contingency plans to the peculiar 
circumstances of the specific incident, based on the information acquired 
at the time." The experience of operations at Stanleyville, Entebbe, 
Mogadishu12 and Kolwezi13 suggests that a successful plan is based on 
speed, surprise and simplicity. The longer it takes to reach the hostages 
the more likely are casualties to result. A complex plan leaves more 
things to go wrong; the army maxim to "Keep It Simple, Stupid" 
contains more than a grain of wisdom. The confusion surrounding the 
rescue operation at Munich suggests a lack of contingency planning. 
3. Trained Units — Rescue operations demand superb skill, fitness, high 
motivation, split-second timing, cool judgement and teamwork — the 
30 
products of constant individual and unit training to a high standard. A 
unit honed to the standards of the British Special Air Services Regiment 
cannot be created overnight from hastily assembled volunteers of diverse 
organizational and training backgrounds,14 nor will it result from 
part-time service and training. Furthermore, a rescue force should be 
equipped with the highest quality weapons, vehicles and kit — it is an 
expensive venture. But again, one need only compare the German opera-
tions at Munich and Mogadishu to appreciate the consequences of poor 
training and the wisdom of investing time and money in the creation of a 
high quality force. 
4. Command, Control and Coordination of Forces — The need for speed, 
surprise, simplicity, as well as timing and teamwork, in the execution of a 
rescue plan requires clear dissemination of instructions and orders to all 
personnel and units involved. This, in turn, demands reliable, secure com-
munications and, above all, a clear chain of command from a single 
designated and recognized operation commander. Weaknesses in these 
critical areas were evident at Munich, where communications failed at a 
critical moment; in the Mayaguez incident, where there is some evidence 
to show that the President and his advisers attempted to influence the 
tactical direction of the operation,15 and in the disastrous Egyptian rescue 
attempt at Larnaca, Cyprus, 1978. In the latter case it appears that the 
Egyptian rescue force failed to clear and coordinate its actions with the 
Cypriot government, which had already talked the hostage-takers into 
surrender. Fifteen Egyptian commandos died in the ensuing firefight 
between the Egyptians and the Cypriot National Guard.16 
5. Finally, there is one immeasurable factor present in all rescue operations, 
successful or otherwise — luck. It is something soldiers swear by and it 
cannot be dismissed lightly. It may be fair to suggest, however, that luck 
follows those who have developed a sound intelligence base, an appro-
priate plan, a superb training program and proper command and control. 
Preliminary reports leaked from the official inquiry into the Iran rescue 
mission seem to indicate that the "bad luck" which plagued the operation 
was due at least in part to poor planning, command and control.17 
The Canadian Dimension 
Canada has been spared the ravages of international terrorism of recent years 
and has not been threatened seriously by internal political violence since 1970. 
One need not be a pessimist to assume that such pristine security may not last 
long into the present decade. The casualties from international terrorism mount 
annually'* and the use of this form of conflict for surrogate warfare between 
states injects a new element of uncertainty into the international political equa-
tion.19 The Canadian Government and its security forces must address seriously 
and soon the question of Canada's preparedness to respond to politically-
motivated hostage incidents. In many cases, the ability to negotiate may be suf-
ficient; there is ample evidence to show that this task is taken seriously by police 
forces at all levels. But if negotiations fail, can we be sure that a rescue force 
which meets the criteria outlined above, will be available at the right place at the 
right time? 
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This author advocates the creation of one or more National Response Teams 
with appropriate supporting services. The journal will return to this subject in a 
later issue. 
Footnotes 
1. Maurice Tugwell. Airborne to Battle: A History of Airborne Warfare 1918-1971 (London, 
1971), pp. 314-15; Time, 4 Dec. 1964. 
2. Dr. Manfred Schreiber, "After Action Report of Terrorist Activities, 20th Olympic Games, 
Munich, West Germany", September, 1972; Arthur B. Fulton, "Counter-measures to Combat 
Terrorism at Major Events", U.S. Department of State, Washington. D.C., 1976, pp. 1-20; 
Bard E. O'Neill, Armed Struggle in Palestine: A Political-Military Analysis (Boulder. Colo., 
1978). pp. 87, 151-52. 
3. Time. 5 May 1980. 
4. Abraham H. Miller, "Negotiations for Hostages: Implications from the Police Experience", 
Terrorism: An International Journal, vol. 1, no. 2 (1978), pp. 133, 135-36, 142-43. 
5. In the Entebbe case, the separation of Jews from the remaining hostages, who were released 
early, raised Israeli fears that the terrorists were preparing the Jews for some kind of violent 
treatment. 
6. The Economist. 10 May 1980. 
7. At the siege of the German Embassy in Stockholm in 1975, Swedish Police did not attempt a 
rescue operation even after the terrorists had executed two hostages. They were still planning to 
flush them out with gas when a terrorist bomb exploded accidentally killing most of the 
terrorists and injuring all of the remaining hostages. Sven Thorander, "Terrorist Attack Against 
the German Embassy in Stockholm on April 24, 1975", International Criminal Police Review. 
no. 307 (April. 1977), pp. 102-10. 
8. Jane's Dictionary of Military Terms, comp, by Brigadier P.H.C. Hayward (London, 1975), p. 
88. 
9. Lieutenant-Colonel Peter A. Kelly, "Raids and National Command-Mutually Exclusive!", 
Military Review, vol. 60, no. 4 (April. 1980). pp. 22-23. The Mayaguez rescue mission cost the 
lives of 15 servicemen. Three more were missing in action and 50 wounded. In addition, 23 were 
killed when their helicopter crashed after take off during an earlier attempt to rescue the ship 
and its crew. 
10. Newsweek. 19 May 1980. 
11. Donald F. Cawley. "The Williamsburg Incident — Anatomy of a Siege", Police Chief 
(January, 1974). pp. 33-34. 
12. German commandos of the GSG9 anti-terrorist unit rescued hostages held on a German airliner 
at Mogadishu. Somalia in October 1977. 
13. In a virtual echo of the Stanleyville operation, French and Belgian paratroops landed at 
Kolwezi, Zaire in May 1978 to rescue some 3,000 Europeans held by Katangan rebels. 
14. The GSG9 force, for example, draws its recruits from the police and the federal border guard, 
and puts them through a rigorous seven and one-half months basic and specialist training. Udo 
Philipp. "Combatting Terrorism in Federal Germany". International Defense Review, no. 6 
(1979). p. 1001. 
15. Kelly, "Raids and National Command", pp. 25-26. 
16. H.H.A. Cooper, "Hostage Rescue Operations: Dénoument at Algeria and Mogadishu 
Compared", Chilly's Law Journal, vol. 26. no. 3 (1978), pp. 102-3: see also Time. 6 march 
1978. 
32 
17. Toronto Star, 6 June 1980. 
18. Data provided by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency indicates that casualties from 
international terrorism were 68% higher in 1979 than in the previous year. 
19. Gerald Holton, "Reflections on Modern Terrorism", Terrorism: An International journal, vol. 
1, no.'s 3, 4 (1978). p. 266. 
THE NEW McCARTHYISM 
by Maurice Tugwell 
Canadians would do well to ponder the injustice they may be inflicting on 
fellow citizens, and the damage they may be doing to their future security, by the 
apparently never-ending investigation of RCMP alleged wrongdoings.' Close 
and efficient political control over covert security service activities is essential in 
any country, particularly a liberal democracy. Failure in this area manifestly 
occurred in Canada in the early years of the last decade. Anyone with the 
briefest experience of responsibility knows that when a system fails, and when 
the consequences are serious, the blame rests squarely on the shoulders of the 
most senior individual involved. The facts that no politician accepted respon-
sibility for this failure of leadership, and that instead the blame has been shifted 
down the chain of command to the men who are least able to protect themselves 
say something unpleasant about contemporary political morality. 
The human consequences were dramatically illustrated this May by the 
suicide of a 30-year veteran of the RCMP immediately after he had testified 
before the McDonald Commission.2 This was the second such incident within 
months. Whatever errors of judgement certain individuals may have made — 
and, on the face of it, there were some big errors — these men acted in accor-
dance with their understanding of their orders to protect the country from 
subversives, terrorists and spies. Although by the illegal style of some operations 
the security men may have damaged the values they were supposed to be pro-
tecting, no one has questioned the sincerity of their motives. The RCMP has 
undergone month upon month of "trial by commission" before the provincial 
(Keable) and federal (McDonald) Royal Commissions," and this has been 
amplified and dramatized by the concurrent "trial by media". Commissions 
may provide a good means of uncovering facts: they are, however, poor 
guardians of the rights and reputations of their witnesses. If the RCMP 
witnesses had in fact been suspected subversives or terrorists, and we had kept 
them in suspense, exposed to questioning and public vilification for more than 
two years, without charge or trial, the hue and cry from liberal Canada would 
have been deafening. Apparently we see no need to bother our consciences over 
injustice that only affects law officers.'1 
This at least seems to be the opinion of Mr. David Lewis, a member of a dele-
gation representing the Canadian Civil Liberties Association which on May 14 
presented the Solicitor General, Mr Robert Kaplan, with a 15,000-name peti-
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